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ABSTRACT
This work evaluates the Department of Defense as a command,
control, and communications (C3) system. The DoD is considered
as the black box into which input is received from the President
and the output is the actions taken by the nested C3 systems,
such as the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Services, and the operational commands. To evaluate the DoD,
the evolution of the DoD, the current organization, and earlier
reorganizational studies were researched. The DoD was examined
to determine if the weak points stated within the studies still
exist and, if so, what should be done. In order to design and
field C3 systems adequately for the DoD, it must be designed
so its lines of command and communications are clear and dis-
tinct and the nested systems are combined in the most effective
way. A well-designed DoD will reduce the costs and the time
to field a C3 system. The conclusion of the paper is that the
DoD needs to be reorganized. A plan is presented which pro-
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Command and Control (C2) is in many ways all things to
all people." [Ref. 1] To some command and control means the
exercise of authority by a commander over his subordinates.
To others it may be a display, a communications system, or an
organizational procedure. For Dr. Gerald Dinneen, former
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command,
Control, and Intelligence), command and control means a sys-
tem by which our military commanders, under the direction of
the President as the Commander-in-Chief, employ the military
strength of our nation. [Ref. 2] The military definition as
put forth in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms is
"the exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures which are employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission." [Ref. 3]
From this definition the term - command, control and
communications (C3) - has evolved. The acronyms, C2 and C3,
have become synonymous. The inclusion of communications has
emphasized the importance of the distribution of information
up and down the chain of the command via whatever arrangement
of the commander's resources. A C3 system divides into the
following parts: "a recognized point of authority, a resource

which can be controlled by the authority; a means to control
the resource by the authority; and a means to perceive the
environment directly or indirectly provided to the authority
in which the resource is to be controlled." The interaction
of these four parts in satisfaction of an objective or
objectives is a C3 system. [Ref. 4]
The Department of Defense (DOD) may be categorized as a
C3 system. The point of authority is the Secretary of
Defense. The resource is the National Military Establishment
consisting of the civilian and military personnel at all
levels of the Department and their weapons and facilities.
A means to control the resource is the World-Wide Military
Command and Control System which provides the medium for
operational direction and technical administrative support
involved in the function of command and control. The means
to perceive the environment is via the surveillance and
intelligence systems.
The categorization of DOD as a C3 system illustrates the
concerns of LT General Hillman Dickinson, the former
Director, C3 Systems, Organizations of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who stated that the C3 community must
"look at the entire C3 system and its interfaces with
intelligence, and at all the ancillary parts from
logistics support through personnel. Look at this as
one system and make it play as one system. Make sure
we have not created a combination of individual projects
which have left weak points in some area. It must be
an entire system operation without weak points if it's
going to survive." [Ref. 5]

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Department
of Defense as a C3 system. It is a C3 system with other
such systems nested within it. The systems are the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the military
departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Each must function efficiently and effectively for the whole
system to work. The interaction of these systems is a vital
aspect of the whole system. As General Dickinson said, the
"entire system operation" should be evaluated to weed out
the weak points and combine the nested systems in the most
effective way. It is important that they do not overlap and
duplicate the same jobs which might confuse subordinate units
The lines of command and communication should be clear and
distinct.
As our nation's former senior military leader has indica-
ted, there is at least one weak point in the defense system -
the current structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
.
General David Jones, the former Chairman of the JCS, has
wondered if the current structure "best serves the nation or
merely the parochial interests of each Service." [Ref. 6]
In the summer of 19 80, while testifying before Congress
during confirmation hearings involving his second term as
Chairman, he advocated that the role of the nation's senior
military leader be strengthened, General Jones said that
"In the two and a half years on this job, I had more
influence individually than institutionally. The
reason, not widely understood, is that the United
states, in setting up the organization of the JCS
more than 3 decades ago, decided on a "compromise

system". The choice then was between separate services
and a highly integrated organization, not necessarily
patterned after the German General Staff, but a straight-
line system. A compromise evolved whereby we run the
joint operation by committee action. And clearly we
are a committee of five with an essentially equal voice
on the issues. In so doing we have gained some strengths,
but also encouraged the intrinsic weaknesses of the
committee system." [Ref. 7]
In the last eighteen years, weak points in the DOD system
have been noted in reports by committees tasked to study its
performance. The committees have recommended varying degrees
of reorganization, but none of the major ones have been
implemented. In this thesis, these studies are reviewed and
their applicability to the present organization is determined,
Recommendations are made to correct any deficiencies. Both
the evolution of the Department of Defense and its current
organization are described to provide a background for the
reorganizational studies.
Recognition of weak points and development of appropriate
changes will better equip the DOD to aid the President and
the Secretary of Defense in meeting their objectives of
national security and world peace. If the lines of command
and communication are clear and distinct and the interrela-
tionships of the systems are more closely defined, future
C3 systems may be designed and fielded with less difficulty.
10

II. EVOLUTION OF THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION
Three decades have passed since President Harry S. Truman
signed the National Security Act of 1947. This act created a
single National Defense Establishment and placed within it
three separate departments and four armed services. The act
was basically a compromise between diverse interests. The
passage of the act involved reconciling the position of those
who wanted one strongly unified military department and those
who insisted on keeping the military services separate.
[Ref. 8]
It is difficult to cite an exact date for the beginning
of the drive for unification of the armed services. Some
date the origins to the Spanish-American War when great
dissatisfaction arose because of the failure of the Army and
the Navy to cooperate fully during the Cuban campaign. In
190 3 the Joint Army-Navy Board was created to secure the
cooperation and coordination in all policies involving joint
action by the Army and Navy. Others trace the origins of
unification to the post-World War I movements for comprehen-
sive administrative reform and economy in government. Several
bills were introduced to create a single Department of National
Defense. Others bellow the idea of unification did not really
originate until World War II. [Ref. 9]
In the early days of World War II, this nation established
unity of command in the operational theatres and set up a U.S.
11

Joint Chiefs of Staff as the counterpart to the British
Chiefs on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The success of the
joint operations during World War II led to the support for
some form of unification in the postwar period.
Proponents of the concept of unification based their
arguments on two premises. First, coordination between the
services in modern warfare was necessary and this could be
achieved best through unification. Second, unification
would bring more economy and efficiency into the military
establishment and simplify the problem of control. Prior to
World War II, our military consumed very few resources so
that not many people were concerned about efficiency and
control. Until 1939 the budgets for the Army and Navy
totalled less than one billion dollars and changes to the
structure were met with little enthusiasm from Congress.
Only one unification bill reached the floor of either house
before 19 41. During the war, President Roosevelt was the
focal point of the huge military machine, devoting most of
his time to the war. This was expected in a war condition
but not during peacetime. The President needed a single
cabinet level officer to do it for him. [Ref. 10]
The Department of Defense (DOD) was created by the 19 4 7
act. It contained the following basic elements: (1) creation
of a separate Air Force as an equal service with the Army and
Navy; (2) establishment of three equal military departments,
each with a civilian secretary; (3) creation of the National
12

Military Establishment under a civilian Secretary of Defense
with "general authority, direction, and control" over the
three military departments; (4) provision of legislative
authority and a charter for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (5)
creation of a Munitions Board and a Research and Development
Board to coordinate interservice activities in these fields;
(6) creation of the interagency policy coordinating organs
on which the DOD was to be one of the represented agencies:
the National Security Council and the National Security
Resources Board; and (7) the creation of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. [Ref. 11]
The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act
strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense by
removing the word "general" from "direction, authority, and
control". They eliminated the concept of powers reserved to
the services, thus changing the National Military Establishment
to the executive Department of Defense and changing the service
departments from executive to military departments. The
Secretary of Defense became the sole defense representative
on the National Security Council and the clause allowing
direct appeal by the military departments to the President
was removed. [Ref. 12] However, the right of the Service
Secretary and a member of the JCS to present recommendations
on their individual initiative directly to Congress was
reaffirmed. A Chairmanship was created for the JCS.
President Eisenhower, shortly after his election, appointed
the Rockefeller Committee to examine the Defense organization.
13

In 1953 the recommendations of the Committee were enacted.
The recommendations were: (1) the insertion of the Service
Secretaries into the chain of command for the unified and
specified commands for the purpose of improving civilian
control: (2) the addition of six Assistant Secretaries of
Defense; (3) the replacement of the Munitions Board and the
Research and Development Board with the Office of Defense
Mobilization; (4) the strengthening of the planning role of
the JCS ; (5) the administrative authority over the Joint
Staff to the Chairman of the JCS; and (6) the doubling of
the number of assistant secretaries in the departments.
[Ref. 13]
By 1957, the public furor over the first Sputnik, the
open interservice rivalry over missile development, the need
for improve control of nuclear weapons and missiles, and the
desire to eliminate duplication in the research and develop-
ment all influenced President Eisenhower to propose a DOD
reorganization.
President Eisenhower felt that greater centralization would
solve the problems in defense. He believed that all forces
must be led as one, and wanted the powers of the Secretary
strengthened. Congress gave in 19 5 8 the Secretary of Defense
approval to reassign common supply and service functions, to
assign the development and operational use of new weapons to
any Department or Service, and to engage in basic and applied
research projects. The Service Secretaries were taken out of
14

the chain of command to the unified and specified
commands. The size of Joint Staff was increased. The
authority of the Secretary over research and development
programs was strengthened. The number of Assistant Secre-
taries and Assistant Service Secretaries was reduced. The
joint operational responsibilities of the Services was
shifted to the unified commands and their joint planning
responsiblities to the JCS . [Ref. 14]
The 1958 Reorganization was the last major statutory
change to DOD . In the 1960 's Secretary Robert McNamara made
especially vigorous use of the powers granted his office.
He continued the practice started by his predecessor of
assigning combat units of the three military departments to
unified and specified commands. By the end of 1961 with the
creation of the STRIKE Command, virtually all combat forces
had been assigned to unified and specified commanders who
report directly to the Secretary through the JCS . He also
continued to consolidate common service and supply functions
under defense-wide agencies as his predecessor had begun.
[Ref. 15]
In the past twenty years the changes have been basically
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The number of
Deputy and Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASD) has varied
depending on the requirements of the President and Secretary
of Defense in office. Each administration has its own way
of managing the Department and deciding which programs and
issues would receive their primary attention. An issue which
15

has received much attention by the present and the previous
four administrations is command, control, and communications.
The interest in the issue started with the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962 and resulted in changes to DOD.
The Crisis and the prospect of the southeastern United
States becoming part of a theatre of operations accomplished
two things: it forced the establishment of the National
Communications System (NCS) , which coordinated all federal
communications resources, and promoted the Washington-Moscow
hot line. The system grew into the World-Wide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS) . With proliferating
requirements and expanding technology WWMCCS moved ahead
rapidly on a broad front with very little top-level direction.
It was believed by the WWMCCS advocates that the system would
perform its communications functions adequately. However, in
the late 1960s the USS Liberty, USS Pueblo, and EC-121 affairs
revealed that the United States command, control, and communi-
cations system was not responsive and fine-tuned as it needed
to be. In each of the incidents highly critical messages were
delayed resulting in loss of military men and equipment. [Ref.
16]
The correction of this problem was high priority for the
Nixon administration. In May 1970 Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird created the post of the Assistant to the Secre-
tary of Defense (Telecommunications) to be the DOD counterpart
to President Nixon's Office of Telecommunications Policy. The
16

Secretary's appointment required no legislation and anticipa-
ted the findings of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel commissioned
by President Nixon to report on DOD. The Panel recommended
that an office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Tele-
communications) be established to manage the defense C3
community. The post was created in December 19 71. [Ref. 17]
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger abolished the ASD
(Telecommunications) in January 1974 in favor of the Director,
Telecommunications and Command and Control. Secretary of
Defense Brown in March 1977 abolished the posts of Director
and ASD (Intelligence/Director of Defense Intelligence) and
established the office of ASD (Communications, Command,
Control, and Intelligence (C3I) ) . With the consolidation of
C3I programs and the associated funding, four major reporting
structures were brought together. These were the Telecommuni-
cations Command and Control Program, the National Intelligence
Program, Surveillance and Warning, and those programs identi-
fied with Combat Support, such as electronic warfare,
positioning and navigation systems, counter C3 and the like.
[Ref. 18]
In 19 79 the C3 System Directorate was established in the
Joint Staff of the JCS . Its mission is to develop policies,
plans and programs for the JCS to insure adequate C3 support
to the commanders and the National Command Authority (NCA)
for joint and combined operations; conceptualize future C3




In 1981 the Reagan administration came into office and
changed the names of the C3 offices in DOD again. The ASD
(C3I) is now the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for C3I
in the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering. The C3 administration changes are reflective
of those made within the DOD in the past twenty years.
18

III. PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The Department of Defense is the largest single agency
in the Government of the United States. It spent approxi-
mately 25 percent of the national budget in recent fiscal
years. In the three decades since its creation, the Office
of Secretary of Defense has mushroomed from a handful of
policy makers to one of the major bureaucracies of the
Government, staffed by thousands of officers, enlisted
personnel, and civilian employees.
The Defense Department includes the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their
supporting establishment, the Departments of the Air Force,
Army, and Navy, the four military Services, the unified and
specified commands, and such other agencies as the Secretary
of Defense establishes to meet specific requirements. The
central function of the DOD is to provide for the military
security of the United States and to support and advance the
national policies and interests of the United States. [Ref.
20]
A. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Secretary of Defense, principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the Department of
Defense, is appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Secretary exercises direction,
19

authority, and control over the Department. (See Figure 1) .
He is a member of the National Security Council, the National
Aeronautics and Space Council, and the North Atlantic Council.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense is responsible for the
supervision and coordination of the activities of the
Department.
The Armed Forces Policy Council advises the Secretary on
matters of broad policy relating to the Armed Forces. The
members are: the Secretary of Defense (Chairman); Deputy
Secretary of Defense; military departments secretaries; the
Under Secretaries; and the Chairman and the Chiefs of the
JCS. [Ref. 21]
B. THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)
Various agencies, offices, and positions created by the
National Security Act, together with certain other agencies
that assist the Secretary of Defense, constitute the primary
staff - civilian and military. Seven Assistant Secretaries
of Defense are authorized under Title 10 (Armed Forces)
,
United States Code. It states that there shall be Assistant
Secretaries of Defense for Health Affairs, Defense Manpower
and Reserve Affairs, and Comptroller. The remainder are
designated by the Secretary of Defense. There are two Under
Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Research and Engineering,
[Ref. 22]
The current defense agencies within the OSD which perform
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C. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)
The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff includes
the JCS, the Office of the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and
certain supporting agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and special offices. The JCS consists of the Chairman;
the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations;
the Chief of Staff, US Air Force; and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps.
The Chairman is appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the Regular
officers of the armed forces to serve at the pleasure of the
President for a term of two years and is eligible for one
reappointment. In time of war no limitation is placed on the
number of reappointments. While holding office he takes
precedence over all officers of the armed services, but
exercises no military command over the JCS or any of the
military Services. [Ref. 23] The Chairman "acts as an
advisor, an implementor, and an integrating influence
whenever possible." [Ref. 24]
23

The Service chiefs are appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a period
of four years, from the general officers of their respective
Services. In time of war, they may be reappointed for another
four year term. They serve at the pleasure of the President.
[Ref. 25] They have dual responsibilities - a member of the
JCS and providing military direction to his service. In
performing service duties, the chiefs are subject to the
authority of the Service secretaries. However, the secretaries
have no control over joint activities. In the JCS the members
are under the control of the Secretary of Defense and the
President.
The major responsibilities are: (1) principal military
advisors to the President, the National Security Council,
and the Secretary of Defense; (2) prepare strategic and
logistic plans that provide guidance for development of the
defense budget, military aid programs, industrial mobilization
plans, research and development and contingency plans of com-
bat commands; (3) review plans, programs, and requirements of
the separate services and unified commands; (4) assist the
President and the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of
their command responsibilities. [Ref. 26]
The Joint Staff consists of not more than 400 officers
selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the approval of
the Chairman. The tenure of the members is subject to the
approval of the Chairman, and except in time of war, no such
24

duty may be more than three years. Officers may not be
reassigned to the Joint Staff, except in time of war, until
at least three years from the completion of their last tour
of duty at the Joint Staff. However, selected officers may
be recalled to the Joint Staff in less than three years with
the approval of the Secretary of Defense but the number of
such officers may not exceed thirty serving at any one time.
The Director of the Joint Staff is selected by the Chairman
in consultation with the other chiefs and the approval of
the Secretary of Defense. The Director must be an officer
junior in grade to each member of the JCS . His tenure is
that of the Staff but he may never be reassigned to the Joint
Staff. [Ref. 27]
The staff performs duties as prescribed by the JCS or the
Chairman. The staff is selected in approximately equal numbers
from the services. The Joint Staff is forbidden by law to
function as a general staff of the armed forces. This means
that it shall have no executive powers in its own name; its
principal purpose is to prepare plans and reports for considera-
tion by the JCS. [Ref. 28]
D. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS (ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE)
The departments consists of the Secretary of the Department
and his staff, the Chief of the Service and his staff, the
major commands of the Service and agencies. Appendix A con-
tains organizational charts of the military departments, the




E. THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
A unified command, as defined in the JCS Publication 2,
is a
"command with a broad continuing mission, under a single
commander and composed of significant assigned components
of two or more Services, and which is established and so
designated by the President, through the Secretary of
Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command
established by the President." [Ref. 29]
Currently, there are six unified commands: Atlantic,
Southern, Pacific, US European, US Central, and the US
Readiness Commands.
A specified command, as defined in JCS Publication 2, is
the same as a unified except that it is normally composed of
forces from one Service. The three specified commands are
the Strategic Air Command (SAC) , Military Airlift Command
(MAC) , and the Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) . The Air
Force provides the forces for these commands.
26

IV. COMMITTEE REPORTS ON POD AND
THEIR APPLICABILITY TO TODAY
Since the Reorganization Act of 1958, several studies
have been accomplished concerning the organization of the
Department of Defense. As soon as 1960 with the election of
President John Kennedy, a report was released criticizing the
organization of DOD . Approximately every eight years a study
has been done on the DOD. The reports to be reviewed span an
eighteen year period, 1960-1978, and are:
1. The Symington Committee Report which was released by
President-elect Kennedy on December 5, 1960. The committee
was chaired by Senator Stuart Symington and consisted of
members who had been involved in military matters in some
capacity, such as Clark Clifford, one of the drafters of the
National Security Act.
2. Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the
Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel com-
missioned by President Richard Nixon in June 1969. He
appointed Gilbert Fitzhugh, chairman of the board and chief
executive of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, as
chairman of the defense panel. It studied, reported, and
made recommendations to the Secretary on the following: (1)
organization and management of DOD; (2) defense research and





3. Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization of
Top Management Headquarters in the Department of Defense
which was prepared by the Comptroller General of the United
States on April 20, 19 76. Further references to this report
will be by the title, General Accounting Office (GAO) Report.
4. Defense Manpower Commission Report which was released in
April 19 76.
5. Departmental Headquarters Study, A Report to the Secretary
of Defense dated 1 June 1978. The study was requested by
President Jimmy Carter and the project manager was Paul R.
Ignatius, former Secretary of the Navy, Under Secretary and
Assistant Secretary of the Army.
6. Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National
Military Command Structure. The study was initiated at the
same time as the previous study and was chaired by Mr. Richard
Steadman, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.
This study reviewed the National Military Command Structure.
The GAO Report and the Department Headquarters Study
found no reasons to reorganize DOD. The GAO Report stated
that the problem was the process by which things are accom-
plished, e.g. the decision making process. It was a
systematic flaw. The Department Headquarters Study found
that the DOD was well-managed and the problem as in any
large organization is to delineate the responsibility in it.
Both of these reports stressed that the Service Secretaries
should be more fully utilized and are a necessary buffer
28

between the Services and the DOD. However, the other reports
contained findings which indicated that the DOD has many weak
points. These are listed in Table I. In a March 1982 article
General Jones mentioned many of these problems, such as prob-
lems in the JCS structure, interservice rivalry, and staff
problems. The problems have persisted through the years,
some since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.
Samuel P. Huntington stated that "interservice rivalry was
the child of unification." [Ref. 30] The National Security
Act which was to provide a strong unified military establish-
ment actually caused the problem of interservice rivalry.
Combining the Services under one defense department caused the
Services to compete against each other. A unified defense
organization meant competition over organizational and strate-
gic doctrine. A unified appropriations process meant
competition for funds.
The Services had different views about unification. The
Army supported the idea of unification for three reasons:
(1) keeping a substantial ground force; (2) restriction of
the size of the Marine Corps; and (3) maximum amount of
security for the least cost. The Air Force, of course,
supported it because it made them equal partners with the
Navy and Army. Also the Air Force thought that they would
eventually gain control of all air resources. [Ref. 31]
The Navy opposed unification because it would introduce two
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possibly even somebody who was hostile to sea power. It
also feared that it might divest the Fleet of two of its
vital parts: the Fleet Marine Force and land-based aviation.
The Navy also feared that , in the name of economy, a single
department might "impose a destructive orthodoxy" in the
field of research and development. The Navy opposed the
single chief of staff concept of the Army in favor of collec-
tive decision-making. The Navy feared that the single chief
of staff would destroy civilian control. They believed that
putting the ultimate authority over the military budget in
military hands reduced the Secretary's control and that the
Secretary would receive only one viewpoint of the situation.
The Navy's view prevailed as to the structure of the JCS ; it
was legislated as a committee. [Ref. 32]
The Navy has been successful in achieving its goals in
spite of unification. It has maintained its organizational
integrity. There has never been a serious attempt to take
away land-based avaiation or to reduce the Marines to a naval
police force. The Navy has fared well in the appropriations
process and sea power is still appreciated by defense officials
and Congress. The Navy's fears about the research and develop-
ment process were groundless. In two cases where OSD tried
to impose an Air Force plane on the Navy, it has been unsuccess-
ful. The occasions were the TFX, a tri-service tactical
fighter (F-lll) and the "low cost" F-16 fighter. The Navy
opted for the F-14 and the F-18, respectively. [Ref. 33]
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The Army and Air Force have not obtained all their goals
from unification. The Army has maintained a large ground
force but have not fared as well as their counterparts in the
appropriations process. The Marines were not reduced in size
as wished by the Army. The Air Force gained its primary goal,
a separate service but not its secondary goal. It does not
own all the air resources nor does it have a lock on the
strategic mission with the advent of the Polaris for the
Navy. The Air Force was forced to procure two Navy-oriented
planes, the F-4 and A-7. [Ref. 34]
The Services are rival tribes complete the separate tribal
customs, philosophies, professional styles, war colleges, and
lifestyles - who really know very little about each other.
Each vying for the money to buy the equipment it feels neces-
sary to fulfill its assigned missions. This results in much
duplication of effort and money. For instance, both the Army
and the Air Force wanted to develop, produce, and operate an
intermediate ballistic missile.
The Army felt that a mobile intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) offered great possibilities as a reinforcement
to our atomic deterrent forces. It had pushed for the develop-
ment of the Jupiter IRBM under the leadership of Dr. Wehnher
von Braun and his team of German-American scientists, since
November 19 55. However, the project was setback, when, in
November 1956, the Secretary of Defense Wilson gave the
operational control of the Jupiter to the Air Force. This
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decision virtually amounted to killing the program, because
the Army version did not appeal to the Air Force. [Ref. 35]
The Air Force opposed a mobile IRBM and in November 1958,
the Air Force directed the Army to remove the mobility feature.
A mobile IRBM would require Army-type troops to move, emplace,
protect, and fire it. According to General Maxwell Taylor,
the Air Force feared that the operational control would revert
back to the Army, if the feature remained. He also believed
that it was a great asset which could have closed the missile
gap, but that the opportunity was lost. The Jupiter was not
a stationary target, as was the Air Force developed missile,
the THOR. [Ref. 36] Today, the Air Force is planning for an
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) that is transported
from one launch point to another, the MX missile, a non-
stationary target.
The Army and Air Force also had different ideas about the
type of aircraft to use for close air support. In 196 7 the
Air Force was developing a fixed-wing aircraft (A-10) and the
Army was developing a helicopter (Cheyenne) to perform the
function. Actually there was another aircraft being developed
by the Marines, the Harrier. In 1971 a Report on Close Air
Support: The A-X, Harrier, and Cheyenne by Senators Charles
Mathias and William Proxmire and Representative John Seiberling
was released. They said it was ridiculous to have three air-
craft which serve the same function. The men recommended that
the A-X should be the choice because a fixed-wing system has
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so much more loiter time. In 19 72 the Cheyenne was killed.
However, the Harrier and the A-10 were developed and are in
the Air Force's and Marine Corps' inventories. [Ref. 37]
The Services are reluctant to spend money on items for
which they have a lack of enthusiasm, such as airlift expendi-
tures by the Air Force and the fast deployment logistics
program by the Navy both intended to support the Army. [Ref.
38] Also, the Services have been reluctant to finance command
and control systems in order to improve interoperability.
Lt General William Hilsman, Director of the Defense Communi-
cations Agency (DCA) , stated that the obstacle to progress
in this area is considerably more political than technical.
[Ref. 39]
In the case of Autodin II, a system designed for inter-
active traffic, i.e. one that will allow subscribers direct
access to a computer data base to pull up small amounts of
important information (number of combat-ready aircraft at
a given base, for instance) , DCA is looking for a constituency
The Services are unwilling to give up their own dedicated
systems to finance a system that offers a lot of potential
merit in interoperability, tighter central control of opera-
ting costs. The system would plug into the Services' own
computers. The Services have resisted and have spread rumors
that Autodin II is in "sad shape, can't deliver"; a common
tactic when the Services do not want a system. [Ref. 40]
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Dr. William 0. Baker, former Bell Laboratories 1 Board
Chairman, says our national security command-communications
system is a potential disaster. He says the military is not
exploiting the technology available. Also "Disaster" refers
as much to the command doctrine of who uses the system when
and how. Dr. Baker stated that the Defense Department has
never accepted the plan of interchangeability and redundant
systems. "Every one, Army, Navy, Air Force wants its own
system". He says "commonality is the essence of Command and
Control, of the nerve system. Integration and redundancy
are essential to effective and efficient military command-
control-communications, but we have the problem of getting
the Services together; of getting the CO (commander) to
appreciate that insisting on his own system may not be the
smartest way to go." [Ref. 41]
A system which has run into many of these problems is
the Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems (WWMCCS)
.
This system was severely criticized by the Ninety-second
Congress in 1971. The House Armed Services Investigating
Subcommittee was highly critical of DOD's management and
operation of WWMCCS. They stated that the system was slow,
unresponsive and that the fragmented and overlapping res-
ponsibility had resulted in inefficient and ineffective
management. However, the fault was not entirely one of
ineffective management but was caused by attempting to force
a relationship between separately developed and technically
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incompatible system that defied all attempts at integration.
[Ref. 42] The Army, Navy, and Air Force, each had their own
system.
Part of the problem also is that the JCS is supposed to
do strategic planning for the military, to provide the big
picture to which systems can be designed. According to a
retired Navy Captain, Paul Schratz, the JCS has not been
doing this planning, but the Service staffs have. He says
that "strategic planning remains a prisoner of parochially
oriented, antiquated concepts of land, sea, and air warfare.
[Ref. 43] The Services have merrily developed systems
according to what they need and not what the Armed Forces
need to perform a function. Melvin B. Kline, Professor of
the Naval Postgraduate School, stated in a class on project
management that the military planners should not ask what
plane, or what ship do they need to transport material to a
destination but rather what is the best means of transportation?
By asking this, the planners have immediately taken it out of
the realm of a particular Service.
The various versions of equipment developed by the Services
and their separate tribal customs have led to lack of inter-
operability between them in joint training exercises and in
some real world situations; for instance, the seizure of the
Mayaguez, a U.S. merchant ship, by Cambodian naval forces on
May 12, 1975. The assault force assigned to land on Koh Tang
(where it was believed the Mayaguez crew was being held) was
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hurriedly assembled. The units were from the Marine Corps
and Air Force and employed in a very short timeframe. The
units had no opportunity to work together; their command and
control relationships and communication networks were uncon-
ventional and made combat support and monitorability very
cumbersome and difficult. The ground force leader was unable
to communicate to the monitoring aircraft that he needed more
support due to each having a different type of radio. The
pilot could not see the fierce fighting which was taking
place on the ground. The assault force also encountered more
of the enemy force than was expected. The Pacific Commands'
procedures did not assure that subordinate units received all
critical intelligence data. The number of casualties was
higher than expected due to not having the latest intelligence
report and the lack of communications. [Ref. 44]
It is true that for a team to be cohesive and efficient
it needs to train together, but command and control relation-
ships and communication networks should not be the problem.
However, in this instance the Marines were transported to the
beaches of Koh Tang by Air Force helicopters and supported by
Air Force tactical fighters instead of their usual cohort, the
Navy. The Services should be able to work together in any
situation regardless of the combination of forces.
General P. X. Kelly, the former Commander of the Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) , is worried that the RDJTF
may be affected by the same type of problems. Almost a decade
after Vietnam (from which the military should have learned
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some lessons) , he admits that the weakest link is inter-
operability and connectivity in command and control between
all of the four Services. The existence of the problem
which all to often reflects the personalities and Service
prerogatives could undermine the entire RDJTF concept if not
resolved quickly. [Ref. 4 5]
The competition of the Services for the rapid deployment
mission has led to cluttered and fragmented command relation-
ships. The responsibility for planning and training of the
forces in peacetime has been assigned to the U.S. Readiness
Command (REDCOM) . The responsibility for the execution of
operations is that of the RDJTF. General Kelly will be
responsible for the execution of plans, devised largely by
others, with forces from all four Services. The forces may
not have been trained jointly because REDCOM has no jurisdic-
tion over Navy and Marine Corps, and only limited authority
over the Air Force. When deployed on a mission, the RDJTF
will come under the jurisdiction of the unified commander
which could cause problems. If deployed to the Persian Gulf,
the RDJTF could be under the control of either the U.S.
European Command or Pacific Command. The chain of command
is not clear and distinct in the organization of the RDJTF.
[Ref. 46]
An example of a faulty command and control structure was
the U.S. Rescue Mission into Iran, April 1980. At the Desert
I site, the staging area for the mission, there were no less
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than four commanders. The operation was conceived and
assembled in components: the rescue force, air group, on-
site, and helicopter force. No one at the site had overall
operational control. The Commander of the Joint Task Force
was not at the site but located aboard a ship in the Persian
Gulf. [Ref. 4 7] The command relationships among those
components were not clearly emphasized and were susceptible
to misunderstanding under pressure; as was the case when one
of the helicopters collided with a C-130. The helicopter
pilots questioned the authority of the person giving the
orders to evacuate. The lack of effective command and
control at Desert I resulted in much confusion. Some of
the components had never trained together. There was never
a full dress rehearsal. [Ref. 48]
Many of the problems were due to the ad hoc nature of
the organization and planning. By not utilizing the existing
Joint Task Force organization, JCS had to start literally
from the beginning. Planning and training were conducted on
a decentralized basis within an informal component command
structure that was not clearly established. Because of the
concern for operational security (OPSEC) , the number of
planners was limited so they had to review their own plans.
[Ref. 49] As one officer stated, a "classical example of
one (a mission) planned and executed by a bureaucracy."
[Ref. 50]
The ad hoc nature of the organization and planning has
been apparent in many of the incident involving the United
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States. The incidents are: Vietnam, Cuban Missile Crisis
(1962), Panama Riots (1964), Tonkin Gulf Crisis (1964),
Congo Rescue Mission (1964) , Dominican Republic Crisis
(1965), Arab-Israeli War (1967, 1973), the Mayaguez Incident
(1975)
,
the Korean Tree-Cutting Incident (1976) , the Lebanon
Evacuation (1977) , the Ethiopian Evacuation (1977) , and the
Iranian Rescue Mission (1980) . Each of these the control of
the situation was centralized in Washington, in some cases
with the President himself. [Ref. 51]
The existing command structure provides little flexibility
and considerable potential for confusion in crisis situations
as demonstrated in the Mayaguz and Iranian missions. Mis-
understandings concerning the forces to be used and to whom
they are assigned; command relationships which are ambiguous,
and which require extensive coordination between parallel
commanders; confusion over the lines dividing areas of res-
ponsibility and jurisdictions; and the increased potential
for mishaps created by one command to execute the plans
prepared by another. The inevitable delays caused by the
layering of commands literally invites the National Command
Authorities to bypass some element of the command. [Ref. 52]
This occurred in the Mayaguez incident. The of ficer-in-charge
of the Naval Patrol Squadron that provided reconnaissance
aircraft for the rescue operation reported that he was being
contacted by all levels of command up through the National
Military Command Center (NMCC) . [Ref. 53] The original idea
of the unified command was to decentralize execution of unified
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military operations, but actually it has become "the conduit
for centralized ad hoc control from Washington." [Ref. 54]
The Blue Ribbon Panel was highly critical of the unified
command structure. The Panel felt that the unified commander
should be given "unfragmented command authority for their
commands" assigned to him. They also found that the unified
commanders were limited in their participation in two very
important processes, requirements determination and the
programming and budgeting process. The requirements flow is
from the major component commander to the Service. The
unified commanders have no opportunity for review and coordi-
nation of the requirements submissions, until after the
requirements submissions have been processed and validated by
the Services. In the programming and budgeting process the
unified commanders would be the most knowledgeable source of
advice on the force structures and equipments necessary to
perform the mission assigned to his command for execution;
but they do not have an effective mechanism for influencing
the process. They are asked by the JCS to provide their
requirements for the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP)
but they have no influence over the Services 1 budgets except
through the component commanders. [Ref. 55]
There was a criticism of the organization made by the
Steadman Report also. It stated that the unified and speci-
fied commanders have no military superior in Washington.
The Report indicated that the voice of these commanders
should be the Chairman of the JCS. [Ref. 56] The Report
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also criticized the current organization of the JCS , as
have others including its former Chairman, General Jones.
Throughout the post-World War II years, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff has-been little understood by the general public and
frequently criticized for its performance or lack thereof.
General Thomas D. White, former Air Force Chief of Staff, stated
that
"This country is not getting the kind of top-level
military advice it must have and could have. The
talent is available but the organization and
functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is faulty.
The result is deficient strategic appraisals, divided
or compromised views, and even complete absence of
important studies. Reflecting the seriousness of
this situation, the President and the Secretary of
Defense are turning to individuals and agencies other
than the JCS for military advice." [Ref. 57]
The primary reason for the problems within the JCS are
the dual responsibilities of the members. All members,
except the Chairman, wear two hats that of Service chief and
that of a JCS member. This structure has tended to nurture
interservice rivalries and frustrated the development of
integrated military policies. Many decisions concerning
numerous military problems have been quid pro quo basis due
to overriding service interests. [Ref. 58]
General White cites one example of the conflict of
interest:
"Annually each chief of service represents to his depart-
ment Secretary and to the Secretary of Defense that the
budget requirements he submits are the minimum needed
by his service to carry out its mission. Within a few
days or weeks the Secretary of Defense refers, perhaps
in a new format, the budgets of all the armed forces
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their recommendations.
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At this point each service chief, now wearing his
Joint Chiefs* hats, must sit in judgment on his own
budget in the light of all other service requirements
and against a dollar-target ceiling on the total.
Since the combined service requirements always exceed
the tentative dollar limitation, each chief must either
renounce as false or padded his earlier declaration,
lose face with his own Service secretary, his staff,
and his service as a whole, or disagree with one or
more of his opposite numbers on the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It is a grueling situation for the top repre-
sentatives of the military services and invariably ends
in disagreement on a matter of vital importance to the
country." [Ref. 59]
Alterations to the structure of the JCS have been made
since the passage of the National Security Act of 194 7, but
none have solved the problems of the original act. They
still exist a generation later. The changes of 1949, 1953,
and 1967 did not achieve their desired results of strengthening
the JCS because none of them altered the power base or consti-
tuency of the Service chief. The chief relies upon his
Service for support and must be responsive to its needs.
The Services have subverted the intent of many of the
basically sound changes. For instance, the Chairman must
seek the approval from the Service chiefs prior to appointing
the director of the Joint Staff and the directorship is
rotated among the Services. The 1958 changes took the Services
out of the chain of command for the unified commands. However,
the Services have still been able to make some of the commands
their "domains"; the Pacific Command, Navy, and the European
Command, the Army. Secretary McNamara tried to usurp the Navy's
hold on the Pacific Command by appointing another Service
officer as commander; he failed.
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Also, according to Laurence Korb in his book, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, he states that the Services do not send
their best personnel to the Joint Staff, nor reward those
who have ignored parochial considerations while wearing the
"Purple Suit". [Ref. 60] The promotion and career patterns
are controlled by the respective Services, and an officer's
career prospects can be jeopardized if he stays away too long
from his Service. For this reason officers have been reluc-
tant to accept assignments in the Joint Staff or Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . [Ref. 61]
General Jones also believes that personnel management is
one of the basic causes of the deficiencies within the JCS
.
He states that there is inadequate cross-Service and Joint
experience in the military, from the top down. The officers
do not have a deep understanding of their counterparts'
strengths and weaknesses, doctrines and traditions. The
officers who assume key positions in the joint system (both
on the JCS and as combatant commanders) have not had previous
experience in the Joint Staff or in the headquarters of a
unified command. The problem is compounded by the statutory
limitations placed on the tenure of members of the Joint Staff
The officers are leaving in a little more than two years to
return to Service positions; as stated before the Services
control the promotions. General Jones has stated that "it
is hard to argue that Joint Staff duty is a path to the top.
With the exception of Army General Earle Wheeler, not a
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single Director of the Joint Staff or one of its major
components has ever become Chief of his Service or Chairman
of the JCS." [Ref. 62]
Service chiefs more often rely upon their Service staffs
than the Joint Staff. A custom that has not changed in over
twenty years is that each chief prior to attending a JCS
meeting is briefed by a senior member of his Services'
staff, the operations deputy. The deputy was earlier briefed
by working-level staff officers with strongly supported recom-
mendations. The Services have maintained large staffs for
policy planning, operations, political-military affairs and
the like (see Appendix A) ; even though the responsibility for
incorporating the perspectives of the separate services into
the operations of the unified and specified commands should
be that of the Joint Staff. [Ref. 63]
The frequent result of "dual -hatting" is split decisions
that have to be resolved by the Secretary of Defense at the
expense of JCS influence. The civilian leadership in the
Pentagon faces a continuous requirement to make decisions,
and it needs advice and help in many fields in which joint
military professional expertise is required in a timely
manner but rarely is.
This is probably a result of another frequent criticism
of the JCS system, the Joint Staff. It usually lacks initial
guidance from senior levels; has cumbersome staffing procedures,
including detailed coordination with the Service staffs that
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sometimes stifles initiative and smothers useful dissent in
a quest for unanimity. [Ref. 64] Rear Admiral Milton J.
Schultz, Jr., Deputy Director for Tactical/Theatre Command,
Control, and Communications (C3) Systems in the Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in a seminar presented at the
Naval Postgraduate School that the Services had to start
working as a team, not individual players. The documentation,
prepared by his office for the Joint Interoperability of
Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) , had been in
the staff coordination loop for six months.
The JCS has no power to force the Services to accept a
recommended policy or to procure a joint system. The
acceptance of these depends upon the attitudes of the Service
chiefs and the Services toward them. A Service chief has
considerable latitude in deciding how best to support programs
of particular interest to his Service. Outside the JCS arena,
he can make his case formally through his Service secretary,
or informally through the OSD staffs. The former tactic often
has advantage of getting the Service views before the Secretary
of Defense in unfiltered form, while the latter provides some-
what greater assurance that when the OSD staffs deliver formal
opinions later on, they will be favorable. [Ref. 65]
An example of the lack of power of the JCS in providing
a joint system for the Armed Forces is the Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) . The system is to
interconnect tactical elements of all US and allied services.
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JTIDS provides jam-resistant, secure communications between
force elements using a high-volume, high-speed digital data
link, which allows command and control nets to share more
information. Each JTIDS terminal can compute its position
relative to other terminals, thus providing location and
identification of all participating platforms as well as on-
board navigation capability. The Air Force was assigned as
the manager of this program.
The JTIDS terminals are to be used by the Air Force, Army,
and NATO. The Navy is developing an "enhanced JTIDS architec-
ture", one that is compatible with the Army/Air Force JTIDS
version. [Ref. 66] The Navy wanted voice included in the
design, so instead of developing one version of JTIDS, we
will have two versions with separate development and produc-
tion costs. The JCS did not have the power to force the Navy
to use the original version, but the Navy got the OSD staff
to agree to their development of a different version.
The Services 1 influences on the JCS are undeniable. The
intent of the JCS was to provide the President and the
Secretary of Defense sound military advice based on "Joint
thinking". When military advice appears compromised by
Service interest, or suspect in quality, the civilian decision
makers turn to other sources . President Kennedy took his
strategic advice largely from one man - Secretary McNamara.




From experiences early in his Presidency, he had a
"once-burned, twice-shy" attitude toward the CIA and the
JCS. The experiences were the Bay of Pigs and Laos. The
plan for the invasion of Cuba by refugees was started in
the last days of the Eisenhower administration. The planning
was done by the CIA and had the stamp of approval by the JCS.
At meetings the JCS stated that the chances of military success
of the plan were favorable. As the discussions proceeded, the
JCS seemed to go contentedly along. After the embarrassing
failure of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy felt he had two soft spots
in his administration, the CIA and JCS. He would never be
overawed by professional military advice again. [Ref. 67]
As Mr. Schlesinger stated in his book, "The President
reserved his innermost thoughts and, in the end blamed only
himself. But he was a human being and not totally free of
resentment. He would say at times, "My God, the bunch of
advisors we inherited. . . Can you imagine being President
and leaving behind someone like all those people there?" My
impression is that among his advisors, the JCS had disappointed
him most for their cursory review of the military plan."
[Ref. 63]
The JCS did not fare any better in the discussions about
Laos. The Russians were providing military assistance to the
Pathet Lao who were attempting to control Laos. The JCS
opposed the sending of limited ground forces to the mainland
of Asia. They painted a picture of an all-out Communist
response to the forces. Their recommendation was all or
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nothing; either go in a large scale of 60000 soldiers, air
cover, and even nuclear weapons or stay out. Because of the
Bay of Pigs, the JCS declined to guarantee success of the
military operations. At meetings the participants had a
hard time understanding the Chiefs' proposals. "Indeed, the
military was so divided that Vice-President Johnson finally
proposed that they put their views in writing in order to
clarify their differences. The President received seven
different memoranda - 4 Chiefs and 3 Service Secretaries."
[Ref. 69]
The military was unrelenting in their opposition to
limited warfare. General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS,
outlined the process by which American action would provoke
Chinese counteraction, provoking an even more drastic
American response. He guaranteed victory only, "if we are
given the right to use nuclear weapons." [Ref. 70] The
President did not take their advice. He put 10000 Marines
on alert in Okinawa, ready to go. The Russians knew about
the preparations and they appeared to have an effect. A
cease fire was negotiated. [Ref. 71]
The advice provided by the JCS proved to be incorrect in
both these instances. The prestige of the JCS was at a very
low point. The President turned more and more to generalists
in military affairs. The JCS became less and less involved
in the area in which they are the experts. The prestige has
climbed in past years, but in the view of General Edward C.
Meyer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the military still has a
49

way to go. He says that "The most critical element facing
the National Security of the U.S. in the next few years is
finding a way to put the military back in its proper role of
providing military advice where military advice is most
appropriate." [Ref. 72]
The problems in DOD have been discussed in various
committee reports and by members of the military and other
government organizations. Recommendations have been made
for improving our defense department but the major organiza-
tional changes have not been implemented. Why? Why has the
Joint Chiefs of Staff not been changed? The answer may be
that the organizational structure is satisfying the needs of
certain people and other organizations.
Congress has sought to perpetuate interservice competition,
or, "as it has been put more cynically, a situation in which
one Service could be played off against the others." The
competition is an important tool in preserving civilian
control. [Ref. 73] The legislative liaison staffs of the
individual Services vastly outnumber the legislative
liaison staff of the Secretary of Defense. Through these
strong ties to Congress the Services have been able to stave
off any changes to their stature within DOD.
The interests of the military are a matter of self-
interest for Congressmen. The late Senator Philp A. Hart of
Michigan described the temptation as follows: "... As pro-
curement moved steadily upward, every member of Congress
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began to develop constituencies that were in some degree
dependent on defense jobs and contracts... It is not
politically hard for me to vote against, say, a new aircraft
carrier. But if the shipyard was in my state and five
thousand people were waiting for the work, I would be
examining very closely, and perhaps less critically, all
the reasons why the carrier might be essential to national
security." [Ref. 74] Perhaps, if the corrections to the
problems hurt a Congressmen's constituents, he would argue
against the correction, even though it may be valid.
The private corporations have "fanned the flames of
interservice rivalry." [Ref. 75] The corporations through
advertisement have supported the Service for which they were
developing equipment. For instance, in 1959, a conflict
between the Army Nike and the Air Force Bomarc was brewing.
Boeing took newspaper and magazine ads to counter the mis-
information spread about the Bomarc. The Army urged Western
Electric to increase its advertising on behalf of the Nike.
[Ref. 76] The corporations would not like to see any changes
made which reduce their number of customers.
Money and votes are powerful reasons why changes are not
made. The Services do not want any changes which might
diminish their power or eliminate any of their missions.
All three, Congress, the Services, and industry, are closely
tied together. A Service needs a new weapon which Industry
X says it will build in the congressional district of
Congressman A. The Service is receiving a weapon that it
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believes is vitally important to fulfill its mission. The
Congressman's district will have a new industrial base for
taxes and new jobs for his constituents and the industry
will make a profit and have made inroads for future contracts
with that Service. These interrelationships may be the reason




'A. THE COMMITTEE REPORTS' RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee reports recommended varying degrees of
reorganization to resolve problems with the defense estab-
lishment. The GAO Report and Department Headquarters Study
recommended no organizational changes but each stressed that
the Service Secretaries should be utilized more fully. The
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel proposed the most dramatic changes
to the DOD of any of the reports. The highlights of that
report shall be presented with the recommendations of the
other three committees interspersed. The panel made the
following recommendations
:
1. The functions of the Department of Defense be divided
into three major groupings: (a) military operations, including
operational command, intelligence, and communications; (b)
management of personnel and materiel resources; (c) evaluation-
type functions, including financial controls, testing of
weapons, analysis of costs and effectiveness of force
structures, etc.
2. Each of these separate groups report to the Secretary of
Defense through a separate Deputy Secretary. The staff of
OSD should not exceed 2000 people. Currently, there is no
statutory limit on the staffs of OSD or the military depart-
ments' staffs. There are restrictions on the size of the
Joint Staff and the Service Staffs.
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3. Figure 2 is the organizational structure recommended by
the Blue Ribbon Panel.
4. The responsibilities now delegated to the JCS by the
Secretary of Defense to serve as military staff in the chain
of operational command with respect to the unified commands
should be assigned to a single military officer. This
officer should supervise the separate staff support on
military operations and the channel of communications from
the President and the Secretary to the unified commands. He
should report to the Secretary through the Deputy Secretary
of Defense (operations) . The officer could be the Chairman
of the JCS, as an officer, not ex-officio; the Commander of
the Tactical Command; or some other military officer. This
recommendation is similar to the Army's stand in 19 47, a
general military staff with a single head.
The Steadman Report did not go quite as far as the panel
in its recommendations. The Steadman Report noted that a
committee structure is not effective for the exercise of
military command and management authority. Such authority
could be more effectively exercised by the Chairman. The
Report suggested that the Chairman should be formally desig-
nated as responsible for providing military advice from a
national viewpoint on budget and force structure issues to
the Secretary. The Chairman should be designated the















































Recently, General David Jones made the following
recommendations to strengthen the role of the Chairman:
- Interservice perspectives should be provided by the
Chairman in consultation with the combatant commanders.
- In areas of joint operational and long-range planning,
crisis management, and a number of routine matters,
neither the Service Chiefs or their staff need to
participate at the level of their current involvement.
- The Chairman should be authorized a deputy to provide
continuity and to assist in ensuring the readiness,
improving the war planning and managing the joint
exercising of the combatant forces. The Chairman and
Deputy Chairman should come from the two different
groupings, one to be from the Navy or Marines and the
other from the Air Force or Army. [Ref. 78]
5. The JCS and Joint Staff would be limited to 250 officers
Staff positions in support of activities such as military
operations should be eliminated. The Steadman Report went
even further in its recommendations.
It would replace the JCS with a body called the National
Military Advisors whose job would be similar to the present
JCS. The members would be senior officers of the Services
but independent of Service responsibilities. The Advisors
would be supported by a joint staff that was entirely inde-




The Steadman Report also recommended that the requirement
for JCS coordination with the Service staffs be reduced by-
including differing views in the body of staff papers rather
than diluting their usefulness by striving for unanimity. The
Report suggested that alternative courses of action be analyzed
more. [Ref. 79] General Jones also believes that the Service
staffs' involvement in the joint process should be limited.
He believes that the Service staffs should only advise the
Service Chief on a Service matter. He also stated that "the
current system in which each Service has almost a de facto
veto on every issue at every stage of the routine staffing
process" should be abolished. [Ref. 80]
The Steadman Report recommended that only the Services'
top officers be assigned to the Joint Staff. General Jones
also agrees with this premise. He believes that the officers
should have more "truly joint experiences at more points in
their careers - and should be rewarded for doing so." The
joint educational system should also be expanded and improved.
An assignment to the Joint Staff or unified command head-
quarters should be part of a upward mobility pattern, rather
than a diversion or end of a career. [Ref. 81]
6. The unified commanders should be given complete command
authority for their commands and the commanders of component
commands should be redesignated Deputies to the Commander to
make it clear that they are in the chain of command.
7. The existing unified and specified commands should be
realigned under three unified commands: Strategic, Tactical,
and Logistics Commands. __

8. The Secretariats and the Service military staffs should
be integrated to the extent necessary to eliminate duplication;
the functions related to operations and intelligence should be
eliminated; line-type functions- e.g. personnel operations
should be transferred to the command organizations. The
remaining elements should be reduced by at least thirty per-
cent. The integrated staff should be no larger than 2000 for
each military department. Currently, each of the Service
staffs is limited to approximately 3000 offficers. [Ref. 82]
The Symington Committee and Defense Manpower Commission
Reports recommended that the military departments be elimina-
ted entirely. The Commissions' Report did recommend that the
Service and Under Secretaries be retained. If this recommenda-
tion was implemented, it would eliminate 18 Presidential
appointees and the positions of approximately 1000 or more who
work directly for them. The Symington Report stated that these
positions duplicated many of those in the OSD and in the
Service staffs and caused much delay due to the extensive
coordination through the three layers - OSD and the two
Service layers . The elimination would reduce the number of
players in the decision-making process. [Ref. 83] The Panel's
Report contained 113 recommendations and of these 92 were
implemented in whole or part. The major recommendations of
this Report or any of the other reports were not implemented.
A neighboring nation had many of the same problems within
its defense establishment. In the late 1960s it made a
drastic change in its defense structure to hopefully resolve
its major problems. ,__

B. CANADA'S REORGANIZATION
On April 196 7, Canada became the first advanced nation
to abolish the Army-Navy-Air Force pattern of military
organization and replaced it with a single armed service.
This organization was a result of two reports, the Glassco
Report, the final report (1962) of a Royal Commission on
Government Organization, and the 1964 White Paper on Defense -
outline of Canada's policies for the next decade.
The Glassco Commission found three central trouble spots.
First, Canada was spending too much on administration and too
little on procurement of new equipment. Second, both adminis-
trative and decision-making processes were not as efficient
as they should be; and, finally, was the question of how to
maintain strong civilian control of the military establishment,
On the first point, the picture painted by the Glassco
Commission was the Canadian military force being buried by
its own bureaucracy. Canada had been able to maintain its
military budget relatively constant but inflation had dimin-
ished its buying power. The success in maintaining a dollar
ceiling had been achieved by shifting the balance between
hardware and housekeeping sides of the budget. Unable to
control the housekeeping (operation and maintenance) costs,
the effects of the budget ceiling fell on the controllable
items, the hardware.
In seeking to adjust the balance of housekeeping and
hardware expenditures, the Commission tried to identify
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administrative functions which might be reduced or eliminated.
They challenged some aspects of the tri-service pattern of
Canada's defense organization. They stated that in many cases
the tri-service organization had led to the duplication or
'triplication' of such functions as recruiting, information,
pay, and intelligence. The Commission found this to be un-
economical. In the area of research and development they
complained "the traditional independence of the three services
gives rise to duplication and waste." [Ref. 84]
The administrative structure of the defense organization
was one of a network of some 200 tri-service committees
charged with coordinating the diverse activities of the
department. In these committees the views of the three
services were given equal weight, and with no overriding
authority vested in any member, each service representative
possessed a virtual power of veto. If its members could not
agree, the committee could be paralyzed. The Report stated
that "In general, the system permits procrastination, and
the absence of a single commanding voice may spell the
difference between sucess or failure in any matter of joint
concern to the three services." [Ref. 85]
The Chiefs of Staff Committee, comparable to the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, had the same difficulties as the
lower committees. The members of the committee were the
Service Chiefs, an independent Chairman, and the Chairman of
the Defense Research Board. The Chiefs were the centers of
power. If the Committee could not reach agreement, the
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Chairman could only report it; he could not impose agreement.
Each Service Chief had direct access to the Minister of
Defense and few failed to use it during controversy. The
Report recommended that the Chairman have a stronger role in
the affairs of the services. In regard to civilian control,
the Commission recommended a staff group outside the armed
forces framework to advise the Minister on the improvement of
operations and administration. This is a check on the power
of the Chiefs of Staff Committe. [Ref. 86]
The Commission recommended that: "(1) provisions be made
for the exercise by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, of the
ministerial power of direction over the armed forces, within
such limits as the Minister may define; (2) the Chairman,
Chiefs of Staff, be given the 'control and administration' of
such elements common to two or more services as the Minister
may designate; (3) in recognition of the change of status
implicit in these proposals, the title of Chairman, Chiefs of
Staff, be altered to 'Chief of Canadian Defense Staffs'."
[Ref. 87] The Report did not recommend the creation of a
single service.
However, in the debates that followed in the House of
Commons, the Liberals thought the Commission was too conserva-
tive. They thought the Services retained too much control.
The Chief of Defense Staffs might become a 'fourth service 1
with a new staff competing against the other three. In 1964
the Government released its White Paper on Defense recommending
a single service under a single Chief of Defense Staff and a
single Defense Staff. ,-•,

The Minister of National Defense, Mr. Paul Hellyer,
totally supported the White Paper and felt that it would
correct defects in the current system. The major defects
were the structure of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as
already noted and the Minister's lack of staffing to
coordinate the initiatives coming from the five men on the
Committee. The principal sufferer of the lack of coordination
and control was the Army who was unable to find and execute
a self-contained, independent role. The Army was ill-suited
for service except in the international, integrated structure
because of the preference of the other services, especially
Air Force, for other roles. The Air Force deprived the Army
of the support, reconnaissance, and transport it needed to
operate as a national contingent. For instance, the Army
wanted the short range transport, Caribou, but the Air Force
was reluctant to use its funds on that type of aircraft.
[Ref. 88]
Another reason for integration was economical. It was
hoped by reducing operation and maintenance costs that more
weapons could be procured; to raise the procurement level
from 13 to 25 percent of the budget. The Government hoped
to save $100 million annually by eliminating 10000 jobs.
[Ref. 89]
The first stage of the integration was to restructure the
upper echelon of the department. On August 1, 19 64 legisla-
tion was passed which abolished the old position of Chairman,
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Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of the individual services.
These positions were replaced with the Chief of the Defense
Staff, Vice-Chief, and four functional chiefs for Operational
Readiness, Personnel, Logistics and Engineering, and Comptrol-
ler General. (See Figure 3.) The integration happened with
very little outcry from the public. Only negative comments
were from retired military officers. This stage of integration
was completed on schedule the summer of 1965.
The next stage was the formation of six functional commands;
a reduction from eleven organized along service lines. Mr.
Hellyer believed that less and less of Canada's military
activities would be isolated air, land, or sea but rather a
combined operation involving two or more services. The new
commands were the Mobile, Air Defense, Maritime, Air Transport,
Training, and Materiel Commands. The final stage, complete
unification of the services, happened in 1968.
Canada achieved some of its goals with the unification of
the services. It reduced the number of headquarters military
personnel by nineteen percent and civilian personnel by twenty
percent in the initial stages. [Ref. 90] Between 1968 and
1982 manpower fell by thirty percent to its current total of
82,858. In 19 81, equipment and research and development was
twenty percent of the defense budget, closing the gap between
thirteen and-a-half percent in 196 7 and its goal of twenty-
five percent. [Ref. 91] In the case of administrative
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In the opinion of some of Canada's officers, the National
Defense Headquarters has become too large, insensitive, and
inflexible. They believe that this has happened for two
reasons: lack of confidence of those above in those who
occupy positions in the lower echelons and the self-interest
of the staff officers. [Ref. 92] They also believe that it
has assumed too many responsibilities, such as materiel
administration and engineering services. This occurred after
the disbandment of the functional Materiel Command. The
officers believe these functions are not valid for a head-
quarters. Its role should be to decide and disseminate
policy, and to monitor performance to ensure that the policy
is effectively carried out. [Ref. 93] The National Defense
Headquarters has become a barrier to effective command and
control practices by lengthening the chain of command.
The Headquarters* problems can be resolved with further
fine-tuning of the structure of the Armed Forces. A dis-
advantage of any reorganizational plan is that too much
responsibility may be placed at one echelon at the expense
of another. A balance must be achieved. The plan must be
evaluated thoroughly before implementation and, afterward
constantly reevaluated to ensure the plan meets its objectives
Unification has solved some of the problems reported in
the Glassco Report. The single service concept is working
for Canada. The concept has a chance in countries having
relatively small militaries with limited missions, such as
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Canada. At the time of the unification, Canada deemed as
its primary missions, peace-keeping or peace-restoring for
the United Nations. These missions require a single func-
tional combat command. [Ref. 94] Unification would not be
the answer for large armed forces with multifaceted missions,
such as the United States.
C. ARE CHANGES NECESSARY TO THE C3 SYSTEM, DOD?
The studies have pointed out weak points in the DOD that
have existed since its creation in 194 7. Minor changes have
been made, but still the problems continue. The Services do
not speak as one; the JCS lacks power; and the organizational
problems continue. These problems hinder the development of
C3 systems within the DOD. Joint C3 systems lack the
enthusiastic support of the Services when the "purple programs"
compete with organic Service needs. Also, the cost sharing
concept cripples a program because it has to be all things to
all people. The Services hold the trump card called the
budget and use it to negotiate to obtain what it wants. This
causes many changes, delays, and cost overruns. [Ref. 95]
The JCS is powerless in forcing the Services to support the
program.
If the Services do not heed the words of retired Navy
Captain Paul Schratz in "militarism or the Military Values",
drastic changes to the structure may result. He stated that
"in planning for modern war, the military services are not
well equipped to do the job which is necessary, because the
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kind of planning needed is to rise above militarism, to rise
above the roles-and-missions-competition among the services
and the engineering approach to strategy." The Services have
been rarely able to do this. He further stated that "the
loyalty of the US military man is to his service institution,
where the technical means become superior to the national
goals. His aim should be loyalty to the American people, and
the means for carrying out the concept of service to his
country should be his military branch of service, not reverse."
[Ref. 96]
All service personnel from the lowest ranking person to
the highest should heed these words. At times we lose sight
of the 'big picture' and wear 'blinders* seeing only our
portion of that picture. And, unless we have the 'big picture',
the development of C3 systems is impossible.
Changes have to be made to the Department of Defense to
eliminate the weak points. Some changes could be accomplished
in the near future; others will require many years to accom-
plish. Canada demonstrated that major reorganizational changes
can be made in an orderly and timely fashion. Canada reorga-
nized their Defense Department in four years. Of course, the
DOD is many times larger than Canada's, but with a little
American 'know how* and initiative it can be done.
D. THE 19 83 REORGANIZATIONAL PLAN
The plan is based upon a phased approach. The first




the restructuring of the JCS according to General Jones'
suggestions. General Jones warned members of the Civilian-
Military Institute that the "JCS must reorganize if the
United States is to avoid an early disaster at the start of
any future conflict." [Ref. 97] The time to reorganize is
now. He believes that the reorganization is more important
than the budget issue which has obtained most of the attention.
Reorganization will determine whether the military will use
the money wisely. The military has spent too much time on an
"intramural scramble for resources and not enough on ensuring
good solid combat capability." [Ref. 98]
General Jones has recommended changes in three specific
areas: (1) the role of the Chairman; (2) Service Staff in-
volvement in the joint process; and (3) the training, expe-
rience, and rewards for joint duty.
He believes the role of the Chairman should be strengthened
as stated previously. These recommendations would require the
Congress to alter the National Security Act and the US Code -
Title 10. To limit the involvement of the Service staff in
the joint process will be the responsibility of the individual
Service Chiefs. They will have to change their practices of
relying on the Service staffs and receive their advice from
the Joint Staff. General Jones believes that the Service
Staffs should provide informational input only and not have
a "de facto veto" on every issue. This would require agree-
ment among the Chiefs and a new coordination procedures. There
is no statute to change; only in-house procedures.
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Another changes is to broaden the training, experience,
and rewards for joint duty. Officers should have more joint
experience in their careers and should be rewarded for doing
so. The joint educational system should be expanded and
improved. Also an assignment to the Joint Staff or unified
command headquarters should be part of an officer's career
progression. The parochial attitudes of the Services must
change. The Services should promote those officers who per-
form well in their "purple suits". The removal of the
statutory restrictions on the Joint Staff would require
legislative action.
The procedural changes could be implemented as soon as
the new Chairman, General Vessey, and the Chiefs agreed upon
them. The attitude toward joint assignments depends upon
the Services and will be demonstrated by the caliber of the
officers assigned to the Joint Staff and unified command
headquarters and how the officers are rewarded for their
work. The changes requiring congressional action will take
longer. General Jones believes that these changes are re-
quired to insure our national security because it requires
the integration of Service efforts more than at any time in
our history. If changes are not forthcoming, more drastic
alternatives may be selected and Congress may be more recep-
tive because of the debate over the fiscal 19 84 defense
budget.
General Jones' recommendations will alleviate some of
the weaknesses in the JCS and joint operations, but they are
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only cursory and more change is required. Maybe his recom-
mendations will be the impetus for further change. They will
force Congress to look at the DOD in a different light. It
seems that Congress is primarily interested in the cost of new
weapon systems, ships, and other hardware; not the structure
used to distribute the allocated funds. Perhaps, Congress
will realize change is required and amend the National Security
Act and associated legislation, according to the plan in
Figure 4 . The plan incorporates the recommendations of the
various studies and provides for the elimination of many of
the weak points listed in Chapter 4, Table I. As General
Dickinson said the weak points must be weeded out and the
nested C3 systems combined in the most effective way.
The fundamental structure of the reorganization is based
on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's proposal. The division of
the OSD into three major groupings reduces the span of control
of the Secretary of Defense. In the current organization, the
seven Assistant Secretaries, Secretaries of the military de-
partments, and the JCS are the Secretary's immediate subordinate
The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management and Resources
should be delegated the responsibility for the following
functions: the Services, research and advanced technology,
engineering development, installations and procurement, man-
power and reserve affairs, health and environment affairs,
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The difference between the plans in this area is the
elimination of the military departments. The panel recom-
mended a reduction in the size of the military departments
and Service staffs and integration where possible. The
military departments duplicate many of the OSD functions and
serve no useful purpose. The Service staffs will be reduced
in scale and scope as well as the functions of the Services.
Interservice rivalry is never going to be completely
eliminated as long as there are separate services and this
paper does not advocate a single service. However, it does
propose the reduction in the functions of the Services and
their roles in the decision-making and budget processes. The
Services main functions will be to support and train their
men and women. They will be responsible for the recruiting,
training, support functions, such as personnel, medical,
chaplains, installation and supplies and maintenance of those
installations, promotions, and pay.
The Chiefs of the Navy, Air Force, and Army will work for
the Deputy Secretary, no intermediate layer. The Marines will
remain under the Navy. Each Chief will have a supporting
staff and should be limited in size. The organization of the
Services will be determined by the Chiefs.
The basic changes are: (1) The Chiefs of staff will no
longer be members of a joint decision-making body; (2) The
Service will only program that portion of the DOD budget
which pertains to personnel and their support and training;
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and (3) The intermediate layer,' the military departments,
is eliminated.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Evaluation should be
delegated the responsibility for evaluation and control acti-
vities, including: Comptroller - including internal audit
and inspective services, program and force analysis, test
and evaluation, Defense Contract Audit Agency, and a newly
created Defense Test Agency. [Ref. 99] The Air Force Test
and Evaluation Center (AFTEC) would work with the Test Agency.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations will be a
military officer appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Another title for this position
could be the Armed Forces Commander. A Vice-Commander will
be appointed by the President. The two officers should be
selected from the different groupings as suggested by General
Jones
.
The Deputy Secretary will be delegated the responsibility
for the following functions: military operations, the unified
commands, operational requirements, intelligence, command,
control, and communications, international security affairs,
and the Defense Communications Agency. The Deputy Secretary
will also have those responsibilities delegated to the JCS
.
The primary difference is that the troops will be directly
under his control.
To assist the Deputy Secretary, a director, either civilian
or military, will be appointed to manage the staff. Also a
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military director will be appointed to be responsible for
the operation of the National Military Command centers (NMCC)
and its personnel. The Service command centers will no longer
be necessary. The NMCC will be the operations center for the
Armed Forces and will continue to perform its present functions
The staff will perform duties as prescribed by the Deputy
Secretary. The Joint Staff at the time of the reorganization
will become the Armed Forces Staff (AFS) . The reorganization
of the OSD and AFS should be carefully planned and monitored
so the existing staff problems will not be replicated and that
the staffs do not become insensitive and inflexible to the
commands
.
The Deputy Secretary will have command and control of the
unified commands. The component commands will have one line
of command for administrative and operational functions -
unity of command. Each unified command and the components
will have well-defined missions to which better C3 systems
can be designed. The components will know to whom they
report and what information is required. The following
commands will be required at least:
1. The Tactical Command (or General-purpose) will be
composed of all combatant general-purpose forces of the
United States. It would consist of the present six unified
commands
2. The Logistics Command would exercise for all combatant
forces the supervision of support activities including supply
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distribution, maintenance, traffic management, and tranporta-
tion. The following would be assigned to this command: the
Military Airlift, Military Sea Transportation, and Military
Traffic Management Commands, and the theatre traffic manage-
ment agencies.
3. The Systems Command would combine the research and develop-
ment and acquisition agencies of the Services. The acquisition
of a new system would no longer be assigned to a Service but
to this command which will consist of the Air Force Systems,
Navy Materiel, and the Army Commands. The Systems Command is
placed in the operational chain to keep it close to its
customers
.
4. The Strategic Command will be composed of the Strategic
Air Command, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, and
the Fleet Ballistic Missile Operations, the strategic TRIAD.
The unified commands will define the operational require-
ments used to program and plan their portion of the DOD
budget. The lower echelons of the commands at the beginning
of the budget cycle will state their needs. At each level
of the command similar requirements will be combined and the
priority of the requirements will be determined. The unified
command will then send the completed operational requirements
package to an agency who will place a price tag on the
individual items and the total package. Each command's
budget will then be in the same format for the AFS and OSD
to review and dicuss. The Services will submit their require-
ments in the same manner for support and training.
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The role of advising the President will be accomplished
by the National Military Advisors. The independent group
will consist of active senior officers from the Services,
retired military officers, and civilians. The members will
be appointed by the President to advise him on all military
matters. The tenure of the members will be at the discretion
of the President. The President with his advisors will form
the national policy.
The basic changes between the plans in this area are:
CI) Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations is a military
officer; (2) JCS is replaced with the National Military
Advisors; (3) An additional unified command, the Systems
Command; (4) No Assistant Secretaries rather Deputy Chiefs
of Staff; and (5) Aerospace Defense Command will not be
part of the Strategic Command, but directly under the control
of the NMCC.
The plan sets forth the means to eliminate many of the
weak points. It is a drastic change to the status quo. It
reduces the power of the Services, eliminates decision-making
by committee, realigns the lines of command for the forces,
reduces many of the staff problems, and establishes an Armed
Forces Commander and his general staff. All of these recom-
mendations could make the C3 system more efficient and
effective. However, before any major reorganization takes
place, many more extensive studies should be accomplished in
specific areas, such as budget, arrangement of the staffs, and




MILITARY FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION
(Excerpts from JCS Pub 2)
SECTION 1. COMMON FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
AND SERVICES
The Military Departments, under their respective Secretaries,
shall
:
a. Prepare forces and establish reserves of equipment
and supplies for the effective prosecution of war, and plan
for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs
of war.
b. Maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly
organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency.
c. Provide adequate, timely, and reliable departmental
intelligence for use within the Department of Defense.
d. Organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to
unified and specified commands.
e. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense budgets
for their respective departments; justify before the Congress
budget requests as approved by the Secretary of Defense; and
administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping,
and training the forces of their respective departments,
including those assigned to unified and specified commands.
The budget submissions to the Secretary of Defense by the
Military Departments shall be prepared on the basis, among
other things, of the advice of commanders of forces assigned
to unified and specified commands; such advice, in the case
of component commanders of unified commands, will be in agree-
ment with the plans and programs of the respective unified
commanders
.
f. Insure that the commander of the unified or specified
command concerned is promptly advised, through his component
commander or other appropriate channel, of planning for signifi-
cant changes in logistic support, including base adjustments,
which would impact on his plans and programs. Such advice
should be provided sufficiently early in the planning process
to enable the commander of the unified or specified command to
express his views and to have them considered prior to imple-
mentation or final decision. This provision is not intended
in any way to discontinue or abridge the Service responsibilities




g. Conduct research, develop tactics, techniques, and
organization, and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and
supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions herein-
after assigned.
h. Develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases
and other installations, including lines of communication,
and provide administrative and logistic support for all forces
and bases.
i. Provide, as directed, such forces, military missions,
and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be
required to support the national interests of the United
States
.
j. Assist in training and equipping the military forces
of foreign nations.
k. Provide, as directed, administrative and logistic
support to the headquarters of unified and specified commands,
to include direct support of the development and acquisition
of the command and control systems of such headquarters.
1. Assist each other in the accomplishment of their
respective functions, including the provision of personnel,
intelligence, training, facilities, equipment, supplies, and
services
.
The forces developed and trained to perform the primary
functions set forth hereinafter shall be employed to support
and supplement the other Services in carrying out their
primary functions, where and whenever such participation will
result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the
accomplishment of the overall military objectives. As for
collateral functions, while the assignment of such functions
may establish further justification for stated force require-
ments, such assignment shall not be used as the basis for
establishing additional force requirements.
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SECTION 2. FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
I
.
Broad Statement of Responsibility and Composition
The department of the Army is responsible for the prepara-
tion of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of
war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with
integrated mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peace-
time components of the Army to meet the needs of war.
The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land
combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport
as may be organic therein.
II
.
Primary Functions of the Army
a. To organize, train, and equip Army forces for the
conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land
—
specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to
seize, occupy, and defend land area.
b. To organize, train, and equip Army air defense units,
including the provision of Army forces as required for the
defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance
with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
c. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other
Services, and to provide Army forces for joint amphibious and
airborne operations and to provide for the training of such
forces, in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
(1) To develop, in coordination with the other Services,
doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of
interest to the Army for amphibious operations and
not provided by Navy and Marine Corps.
(2) To develop, in coordination with the other Services,
the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed
by the Army and Marine Corps forces in airborne
operations. The Army shall have primary interest
in the development of those airborne doctrines,
procedures, and equipment which are of common
interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.
d. To provide an organization capable of furnishing
adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the Army.
e. To provide forces for the occupation of territories
abroad, to include initial establishment of military govern-




f. To formulate doctrines and procedures for the
organizing, equipping, training, and employment of forces
operating on land, except that the formulation of doctrines
and procedures for the organization, equipping, training,
and employment of Marine Corps units for amphibious operations
shall be a function of the Department of the Navy, coordinating
as required.
g. To conduct the following activities:
(1) The administration and operation of the Panama
Canal.
(2) The authorized civil works program, including
projects for improvement of navigation, flood
control, beach erosion control, and other water
research developments in the United States, its
territories, and its possessions.
(3) Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.
Ill . Collateral Functions of the Army
To Train forces
:
To interdict enemy sea and air power and communications
through operations on or from land.
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SECTION 3. FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
I
.
Broad Statement of Responsibility and Composition
The Department of the Navy is responsible for the prepara-
tion of Navy and Marine Corps forces necessary for the effec-
tive prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in
accordance with integrated mobilization plans, for the expan-
sion of the peacetime components of the Navy and Marine Corps
to meet the needs of war.
Within the Department of the Navy, the Navy includes naval
combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic
therein, and the Marine Corps includes not less than three
combat divisions and three air wings and such other land combat,
aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.
II
.
Primary Functions of the Navy and Marine Corps
a. To organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Corps
forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat opera-
tions at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and
land-based naval air components—specifically, forces to seek
out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea
commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to
control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of
communication, to establish and maintain local superiority
(including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and
defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land and air
operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval
campaign.
b. To maintain the Marine Corps, having the following
specific functions:
(1) To provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms,
together with supporting air components, for
service with the fleet in the seizure or defense
of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of
such land operations as may be essential to the
prosecution of a naval campaign. These functions
do not contemplate the creation of a second land
army.
(2) To provide detachments and organizations for
service on armed vessels of the Navy and security
detachments for the protection of naval property
at naval stations and bases
.
(3) To develop, in coordination with other Services,
the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment
employed by landing forces in amphibious operations.
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The Marine Corps shall have primary interest
in the development of those landing force
doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment
which are of common interest to the Army and the
Marine Corps.
(4) To train and equip, as required, Marine forces
for airborne operations, in coordination with the
other Services, and in accordance with doctrines
established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(5) To develop, in coordination of the other Services,
doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest
to the Marine Corps for airborne operations and
not provided for in subparagraph 20202c (2) above.
c. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other
Services, and to provide naval forces, including naval close
air support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious opera-
tions, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of
all forces assigned to joint amphibious operations in accord-
ance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
d. To develop, in coordination with the other Services,
the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for
amphibious operations and the doctrines and procedures for
joint amphibious operations.
e. To furnish adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence
for the Navy and Marine Corps.
f. To organize, train, and equip naval forces for naval
reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping,
and minelaying, including the air aspects thereof, and con-
trolled minefield operations.
g. To provide air support essential for naval operations.
h. To provide sea-based air defense and sea-based means
for coordinating control for defense against air attack,
coordinating with the other Services on matters of joint
concern.
i. To provide naval (including naval air) forces as
required for the defense of the United States against air
attack, in accordance with doctrines established by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
j. To furnish aerial photography, as necessary, for Navy
and Marine Corps operations.
83

Ill . Collateral Functions of the Navy and Marine Corps
To train forces:
a. To interdict enemy land and air power and communi-
cations through operations at sea.
b. To conduct close air and naval support for land
operations
.
c. To furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes
d. To be prepared to participate in the overall air
effort, as directed.
e. To establish military government, as directed, pending
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SECTION 4. FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
I
.
Broad Statement of Responsibility and Composition
The Department of the Air Force is responsible for the
preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective
prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in
accordance with integrated mobilization plans, for the
expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to
meet the needs of war. The Air Force, within the Department
of the Air Force, includes avaiation forces, both combat and
service, not otherwise assigned.
II
.
Primary Functions of the Air Force
a. To organize, train, and equip Air Force forces for
the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the
air—specifically, forces to defend the United States against
air attack in accordance with doctrines established by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to gain and maintain general air
supremacy, to defeat enemy air forces, to control vital air
areas, and to establish local air superiority except as
otherwise assigned herein.
b. To develop doctrines and procedures, in coordination
with the other Services for the unified defense of the United
States against air attack.
c. To organize, train, and equip Air Force forces for
strategic air warfare.
d. To organize and equip Air Force forces for joint
amphibious and airborne operations, in coordination with the
other Services, and to provide for their training in accord-
ance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
e. To furnish close combat and logistic air support to
the Army, to include airlift, support, and resupply of
airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical reconnais-
sance, and interdiction of enemy land power and communications
f. To provide air transport for the Armed Forces, except
as otherwise assigned.
g. To develop, in coordination with the other Services,
doctrines, procedures, and equipment for air defense from
land areas, including the continental United States.
h. To formulate doctrines and procedures for the organi-
zing, equipping, training, and employment of Air Force forces.
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i. To provide an organization capable of furnishing
adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for the Air Force
j . To furnish aerial photography for cartographic
purposes.
k. To develop, in coordination with the other Services,
tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air
Force for amphibious operations and not provided by the Navy
and Marine Corps.
1. To develop, in coordination with the other Services,
doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force
forces in airborne operations.
Ill . Collateral Functions of the Air Force
To train forces:
a. To interdict enemy sea power through air operations.
b. To conduct antisubmarine warfare and to protect
shipping.
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